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Abstract: Resource-rich Sub-Saharan countries have found themselves trapped in the so-
called resource curse. The importance of the aforementioned countries both as sources of 
natural resources and as consumer markets has been recognized by major world powers. It is 
rational to assume that the world power that manages to assist Sub-Saharan countries in 
dealing with the aforementioned curse will be given a preferential treatment in their future 
economic interaction. Thus finding an instrument that can deal with the resource curse has 
become of large importance. One of the major powers that has been present in Africa for a 
long time is China; which has recognized this opportunity and thus enhanced its engagement 
in the Sub-Saharan region, primarily through the Infrastructure for Resources model. This 
model enables developing countries to expand their infrastructure by relying on their resource 
wealth. Thus, it partially subdues the resource curse, which is empirically verified though a 
case study on its implementation in Angola. It is important to note that there is no consensus 
among scholars regarding the nature of China‟s involvement in Africa. However, this research 
avoids ideological debates, and focuses solely on the efficiency of the model in dealing with 
the resource curse. 
 
Keywords: Infrastructure for resources, oil for Infrastructure, resources for loans, resource 
curse, tied loans 
 
Introduction 
It is a widely held view that the majority of resource-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Angola, the Sudan, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and others) have been 
trapped in the so called resource curse, which has hindered their development.
1
 Thus, it is 
unsurprising that many authors, such as Mabikke (2012), Kelley (2012), Cheru (2013), 
Kennan (2009), have recognized the importance of finding a way to subdue it. In fact, now 
there is an extensive amount of literature available on the causes and consequences of the 
resource curse, and this research does build upon that foundation.
2 
However, only a small 
share of the literature makes the connection between Chinese presence and the resource curse 
in Africa, while none focuses specifically on the role of China‟s Infrastructure for Resources 
model. The authors that did draw a connection between China and the resource curse in Sub-
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Saharan Africa came to negative conclusions. For example, Kelley dealt with the increase in 
Chinese investment in African infrastructure, and concluded that it “has the potential to 
exacerbate the misgovernance aspect of the resource curse” (Kelley, 2012: 39). Furthermore, 
Meyersson, Padró and Qian  highlighted how exporting to China does benefit economic 
growth, but with regard to human rights their results “show that exporting natural resource to 
China has an adverse effect” (Meyersson, Miquel and Qian, 2008: 4). Kennan put forward 
that, in Angola, China‟s involvement allowed the government to evade implementing the IMF 
required reforms, which he claims would have improved Angola‟s governance and thus 
helped it deal with the resource curse (Kennan, 2009).  
In fact, the majority of researchers have taken a skeptical approach towards China‟s 
involvement while the stance that resources are the primary reason for China‟s growing 
involvement in Africa has become almost unanimous (Butts and Bankus, 2009; Cheru, 2013). 
As Cheru correctly pointed out, African countries are encountering considerable obstacles, but 
also opportunities, owing to the worldwide increase in demand for natural resource (Cheru, 
2013). A divergence in opinion is noticeable between Western and African researchers, with 
African researchers portraying this involvement in more positive terms.
3
 This is unsurprising 
when bearing in mind the fact that the local population holds correspondingly positive views 
(Egbula and Zheng, 2011). On the other hand, authors such as Hughes Butts and Bankus are 
more cautious towards this interaction and highlight the potential damage that China‟s actions 
might have on the democratic development of African countries (Butts and Bankus, 2009). 
Egbula and Zheng also share this view (Egbula and Zheng, 2011).  
Rather than add to the amount of research done on the nature of China‟s involvement, and its 
side-effects, this research will focus on a specific characteristic of the Infrastructure for 
Resources model. More precisely, this research claims that the Infrastructure for Resources 
model can partially subdue the resource curse, and thereby remove one of the main obstacles 
to the development of resource-rich African countries. This research utilizes an 
empiricist/positivist approach, and as stated in the rational choice theory, presupposes that 
both parties act solely on the basis of their own rational interests. The first half of the paper, 
which presents the key characteristics of the model and of the resource curse, is based on 
qualitative data, while the latter part utilizes a quantitative analysis of data in order to, through 
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the Angola case study, to empirically verify the main hypothesis. This research will not delve 
into the obstacles to its implementation nor its implications for the political development of 
countries. The motivation for this research stems from the aforementioned lack of such an 
analysis of the Infrastructure for Resources model, which has become an integral part of 
China‟s contemporary economic interaction with African countries. 
Historical Background 
Two key factors, China‟s domestic experience with a specific type of Japanese economic 
involvement, and the inefficient Western developmental assistance policies in Africa, were 
behind China‟s decision to reformulate its economic policy towards Africa. In 1973, 
concerned about its energy security in the wake of the first oil price crisis, Japan decided to 
branch out its supply sources by importing oil from China, thus becoming the first country to 
move into the Chinese market. Few years later, oil represented almost half of Japanese 
imports from China. A step further was made in 1978, when China and Japan agreed upon a 
long term trade agreement. The trade agreement was based on Japan providing China with 
low interest loans as a way for China to finance technology imports from Japan, while China 
was to subsequently repay these loans by exporting oil and coal of a corresponding value 
(Brautigam, 2009). It was said that “the construction of an oilfield will be paid for with oil, 
construction of a coal mine will be paid for with coal, and construction of a factory will be 
paid for with the products of the factory” (Brautigam, 2009: 49). Japan‟s initial loans were 
used to build infrastructure for facilitating the export of raw materials to Japan. More 
precisely, China used the loans to expand its transport and export capacity. Subsequently, 
Japanese companies thrived while China‟s infrastructure expanded to facilitate the growth of 
its economy (Brautigam, 2009).     
China has drawn from the aforementioned experience in shaping the Infrastructure for 
Resources model. However, it was the lagging development of African countries and the 
policies being implemented by international institutions and Western countries that created 
the grounds for the implementation of the model. In the 1970s, Africa‟s industrial growth 
started to slow down. During this period, structural adjustment programs that came in tandem 
with demands for market liberalization and privatization were the most common instruments 
of economic assistance, even though their effectiveness was increasingly being questioned 
(Brautigam, 2009). Thus, some researchers hold the World Bank and IMF‟s structural 
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adjustment policies responsible for such a development.
4  
The situation was especially 
precarious in Sub-Saharan countries, whose economies were negatively influenced by a 
mixture of vast debt, austerity measures and the aforementioned structural adjustment policies 
demanded by international financial institutions in exchange for access to loans (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, inadequate funding for infrastructural development has been restraining the pace 
of African economic development (Africa Finance Corporation, 2015; Deloitte, 2014; Mbaku, 
2013). 
By the late 1980s, World Bank loans came with around sixty various conditions (Kelley, 
2012). These conditions included economic and/or governance reforms, which unsurprisingly 
made it unpopular among African leaders (Brautigam, 2009). One Ugandan government 
employee specified: “The fact that a country gives you aid makes them think they have a 
license to tell you how to run your affairs. These conditions are probably well-intentioned, but 
they are humiliating” (Ibid.: 149). Nowadays, many economists are questioning the effect that 
conditions attached to aid had during the previous decades.
5
 Jeffrey Sachs, a proponent of 
providing assistance to Africa, stated that: “The idea that aid should be heavily 
conditioned with political conditions was a mistake. The best way to end conflict is to 
end poverty” (Reuters, 2006). Even before the onset of the global financial crisis, the World 
Banks‟ projects in Sub-Saharan Africa had a realization rate smaller than 50 % (Brautigam, 
2009: 230).  
If we focus our attention only on resource-rich Sub-Saharan countries, which were among 
those receiving aid, then we can argue that the reason why such resource-rich countries 
required economic assistance from the international community is due to them being trapped 
in the so-called resource curse. Otherwise, such countries, due to their resource wealth, were 
supposed to be in no need of assistance.
6
  
The Resource Curse 
In fact, through time we have been able to spot patterns highlighting how resource-rich 
countries with lacking democratic institutions, have trouble translating resources into 
development (Kennan, 2009). Such countries tend to do a poor job of building efficient state 
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institutions. This is because governments that gain most of their revenues from the export of 
natural resources are freed from the pressure of taxing their citizens. Furthermore, such 
countries are vulnerable to civil wars since political parties (also called elites) in such 
countries build loyal political networks through the distribution of patronages. More 
specifically, the political parties will use bureaucracies as instruments for patronage, and will 
try to make them as big as possible. Such a situation has been termed the resource curse 
(Ibid.).  
A short-sighted emphasis on the extraction of natural resources as an instrument of economic 
development is an enticing option for many resource-rich African countries. However, it is an 
approach that might endanger their long-term growth (Cheru, 2013). For decades, such 
countries have experienced various negative side effects of their reliance on exports of natural 
resources; these effects were later jointly termed the resource curse (Kelley, 2012). The 
widespread view among the researchers is that without the simultaneous growth of the 
manufacturing sector such countries can find themselves unable to evade the resource curse 
(Ibid.).  
The resource curse includes three main aspects: 1) Dutch disease
7
, 2) vulnerability due to 
commodity dependence, 3) and adverse effects on the governance of the country (Ibid.).
 
According to the so-called Dutch disease, income from the export of natural resources drives 
a country‟s currency to appreciate, resulting in its exports becoming uncompetitive (Condon, 
2012). The subsequent higher price of the products decreases international demand and thus 
the domestic manufacturing sector gradually decreases. Therefore, the inability to produce 
competitive manufacturing exports prevents such countries from attaining a sustainable long 
term economic development (Kelley, 2012). Furthermore, the inability to create a stable 
economic growth is closely related to the vulnerability of resource-reliant economies to the 
oscillations of prices on the global market (Ibid.). 
In addition, because the government of a resource-rich country does not have to tax its 
citizens, they are not as likely to ponder over how and on what the government budget is used 
(Kelley, 2012). Thus, such large resource revenue can also interfere with the governance of a 
country (Condon, 2012).
 Some would say that “the heart of the resource curse is that resource 
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rents make democracy malfunction.” (Kelley, 2012:  37). More specifically, corruption and 
bad governance are the consequence of patronage politics, which come into play due to the 
aforementioned revenue from resource exports. In addition, the more a country is fragmented 
with different ethnicities, the larger the influence of patronage politics; this is the reason why 
Africa is plagued by widespread corruption. Together, patronage politics and ethnic division 
enable political parties to use the resource revenues for gathering political support (Kelley, 
2012). 
Western developmental approaches have been unable to efficiently tackle these issues, and 
therefore have been unintentionally hindering African development (Kelley, 2009)
. However, 
China has recognized the importance of utilizing an economic approach that would subdue the 
resource curse. In the next part of the research we shall examine how China managed to 
develop an economic model that can subdue the resource curse and thereby immensely help 
these resource-rich developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Causality between Resource wealth and Conflict.
 8 
This figure highlights 
the resource curse that threatens resource-rich developing countries. It does so by 
linking overreliance on resource exports with the potential for internal conflict; the 
bigger the share of resource based exports in the overall export volume, the higher 
the chance of internal conflict. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Source: World Bank, Angola: Oil, Broad-based Growth, and Equity (World Bank Country 
Study, Washington DC, 2007), p. XXXVII. 
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The Infrastructure for Resources Model 
The Chinese government noticed that Western countries and institutions were moving funding 
away from infrastructure in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). Seeing an opportunity for a different 
approach, China started using resource-backed loans as a practical instrument for diversifying 
its supply of natural resources (Butts and Bankus, 2009). Thus, it would provide economic 
assistance while simultaneously gaining long term access to sources of natural resources 
(Brautigam, 2009). The primary motivation behind the creation of this model was that 
economic growth was overtaking China‟s natural resources production, and thus in 1993 
China turned into a net importer of oil (Alden, 2009). This was the starting point of the 
Infrastructure for Resources model. 
The Infrastructure for Resources model is a framework in which the repayment of the loans 
utilized for infrastructure projects is done through natural resources (OECD, 2011). This deal 
was innovative since, for the first time, it seemed like African countries‟ resource-wealth 
could be directly converted into development projects. Therefore, the contemporary China-
Africa relationship highlights an era in which countries have an additional option for 
financing their development. The fact is that African countries need to extend their 
infrastructure and that China is fulfilling this demand. These countries are incapable of 
attracting enough donor aid and nobody else is willing to provide funding for infrastructural 
development (Brautigam, 2009). Ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone Alhaji 
Momodu Koroma elaborated on the difference between China and other donors by stating: 
“There is a difference, and it is huge. What they want to help you with is what you have 
identified as your need. With Britain, America, they identify your needs” (Ibid.: 140).  
However, to consider infrastructure as a sort of prerequisite for economic development is not 
a novel approach. The “Four Modernizations” that China embarked on in the 1970s put an 
emphasis on infrastructural development (Ibid.).
 
Infrastructural development is a key feature 
of China‟s economic engagement with Africa, just as it was for other actors, like the World 
Bank. Between 1946 and 1961, 75% of World Bank loans were given for infrastructural 
projects, but the focus was shifted to other areas prior to the independence of most of the 
African states (Ibid.).  
Since then, China has experimented with various approaches, and its Infrastructure for 
Resources model revolves around implementing successful experiments (Ibid.). Thus, while 
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the West has shifted its efforts from infrastructure to distributing food and medical assistance, 
Chinese engagement remains focused on extending the infrastructure (Ibid.). 
China‟s decision to enhance its interaction with Africa is based on the pragmatism of the 
Infrastructure for Resources model
 
, which envisages developing countries using their natural 
resources as a foundation for their development, in the same way as China did previously. 
More precisely, the model shows African countries how to develop by using natural resources as 
collateral in loans aimed at infrastructural construction (Tapula, 2013). Such an approach allows 
partaking African countries to avoid spending their limited foreign exchange reserves for 
infrastructural development (Brautigam, 2009). The reason why the model emphasizes 
infrastructure is in order to decrease the local production costs, and subsequently boost the 
local production and the need for Chinese manufacturing equipment (Ibid.). China is also 
assisting African countries in extending their energy infrastructure, thus reducing electricity 
shortages that were once hindering their economic growth (Information Office of the State 
Council, 2013; World Bank, 2004). 
Today, resource-backed loans are a key instrument in the increasing Chinese interaction with 
Africa. This is because they form the Infrastructure for Resources model. Such loans use 
natural resources as collateral for the construction of infrastructure (Brautigam, 2009). In fact, 
through the Infrastructure for Resources model, the Chinese government can use the same 
funds twice. First, China can use the funds to import resources, and second, to reimburse 
Chinese companies for the infrastructure that they constructed overseas (Ibid.).
 
Furthermore, 
as mentioned before, the loan is used both to pay the companies and as payment for resources 
(Corkin, 2011). Thus, it is used twice by the Chinese government while never leaving its full 
control. Furthermore, it is also considered a tied loan because involved companies (usually 
constructor companies) are generally Chinese ones, and have to use Chinese goods 
(Brautigam, 2009).  
Hence, it is understandable why the Infrastructure for Resources model requires careful 
coordination between the various participants. In addition to the two governments, a Chinese 
company is utilized for building the infrastructure, and another one is required for extracting 
the resources (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the resource backed loans are dispensed through 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the main one being the Export-Import Bank (EXIM 
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Bank). EXIM Bank is one of China‟s three policy banks, and by 2007 it had developed into 
the World‟s biggest export credit agency (Ibid).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Framework of the Infrastructure for Resources Model
9
. 
As per the terms of the Infrastructure for Resources model, Chinese companies carry out 
infrastructural projects and are reimbursed by the EXIM Bank, which deducts the construction 
expenses from the value of resources that African countries transfer to the Chinese 
government (Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power, 2010). Therefore, instead of transferring the 
loan funds to the African governments, the funds are transferred directly to the companies 
undertaking the construction work (Corkin, 2011). Thereby, the Infrastructure for Resources 
model reduces the chance of corruption occurring, which in turn helps to subdue the resource 
curse (Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power, 2010).  These payments by the EXIM bank are 
guaranteed by, and based on, the resource backed loans (OECD, 2011).  
According to the terms of the aforementioned resource backed loans, 30% of the contracted 
companies have to be domestic ones, and thus Chinese construction companies have become 
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comprehensively involved in the on-going projects (Campos and Vines, 2007). This was 
incorrectly recounted as being inherent to the Infrastructure for Resources model; actually, the 
guarantee of a 30% involvement for local companies was the condition that Angola had 
included into the agreement (Brautigam, 2009). Even though such an arrangement sounds 
good, it also has a drawback. The aforementioned 30% guarantee leads to subcontracting, 
which implies that when a company wins a contract, it then contracts another smaller 
company to do the job instead, but for a smaller fee than it received. In Angola, Angolan 
companies that receive the contracts due to the 30% clause, subcontract them to Chinese 
companies that can do the same job more efficiently, and less costly (Ibid.). Other important 
aspects of the model are that three Chinese companies bid for each project. The 
aforementioned Chinese construction companies are selected by EXIM Bank and the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce and are later approved by the African government (Thompson, 2012). 
The price of the resources that back the loan is not determined up-front, but calculated at the 
market price on the day it is sold (Brautigam, 2009). Furthermore,
 
loans that form this model 
are tied, and this model shows how China has learned how to assist foreign countries while 
also fulfilling its own rational national interests. Loans that are tied to products and services 
which originate from the benefactor country have a lot of critics, and for objective reasons 
(Ibid.). Tied loans ensure that recipient countries have to spend them on goods and services from 
the benefactor country. One research argues that tying loans reduces their efficiency from 15 to 
30% (Kegley and Blanton, 2014). If the benefactor country is a highly-developed country then 
its products have a comparatively high cost, thus reducing the real value of the loan 
(Brautigam, 2009).
 
The Model and the Resource Curse 
As stated previously, there are three main characteristics of the resource curse. This section 
will present the effect of the model, from a theoretical standpoint, on the aforementioned 
aspects of the resource curse. 
Theoretical effect of the model on the resource curse: 
1. Dutch disease – Positive effect 
The model would not lead to inflation, since the funds are not to be transferred to the recipient 
country; rather the funds are to be used to reimburse the companies constructing the 
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infrastructure. Furthermore, by expanding the infrastructure the model is to create the 
foundation for the expansion of the manufacturing sector. 
2. Vulnerability due to commodity dependence – No effect 
Resource-rich countries would still be vulnerable to the change in prices of commodities due 
to the fact that the price of the resources that back the loans would not be determined up-front, 
but rather it would be calculated at the market price on the day that they are sold
 
(Brautigam, 
2009; Economy and Levi, 2014).  
3. Adverse effects on the governance of the country – Positive effect 
Having a loan administered by the lender can ensure that it is not used for other purposes 
(Brautigam, 2009). This model does not function in the same manner as loans from the IMF 
or the World Bank, which are transferred directly into the government‟s account, from where 
they can be misused. Revenues from sales of natural resources at the international markets are 
vulnerable to the same risks (Ibid.). In the case of Chinese resource-backed loans, the funds 
are never physically transferred to the African governments. Thus, by keeping the funds in 
China, the chance that any misuse of funds would transpire is reduced. Furthermore, this 
aspect of the model would also help African leaders endure patronage pressures coming from 
their populations, because the funds would stay in China for the duration of the project, 
preventing them from being used for other purposes.  
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Figure 3: The Ideal Outcome of the Infrastructure for Resources Model
10
. The 
implementation of the Infrastructure for Resources model leads to the expansion of 
the infrastructure in the recipient country. Since infrastructure is a prerequisite for 
manufacturing activity, it eventually leads to a growth of the manufacturing sector. 
Thus, a resource-rich country becomes less dependent on the resource rents, and 
enjoys a more diversified economy. Overall, the resource curse loses its grip on a 
resource-rich, developing country. 
 
Angola Case Study 
A case study on Angola will be utilized to empirically verify the previous claims about the 
Infrastructure for Resources model and its effect on the resource curse. Angola is a resource-
rich developing country, exactly the type of a country that is most often trapped by the 
resource curse. More precisely, for the Angolan economy oil is of utmost importance. 
According to the African Development Bank, oil production and supporting activities are 
responsible for 38% of GDP, 98% of exports, and almost 80% of government income in 2012 
(African Development Bank, 2012). Another characteristic of countries trapped in the 
resource curse is instability and civil conflict, in fact, Angola experienced one of the longest 
civil wars in Africa (Newitt, 2000). A key player since the end of this 25-year long civil war 
has been China, which has been instrumental in the reconstruction of Angola (Stead and 
Rorison, 2010). This relationship has become so important that, since 2004, the Infrastructure 
for Resources model has also become known as the “Angola model” (OECD, 2011).  
Effect of the model on the resource curse in Angola: 
1. Dutch disease – Positive effect 
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Angola has been experiencing inflation, but the model itself did not lead to inflation neither 
did it inhibit local production; rather, by expanding the infrastructure it is creating the 
prerequisite for attracting FDI and increasing local manufacturing (see Table 2). In fact, 
Angola‟s manufacturing sector experienced the fastest growth in Africa in the period from 
2005 till 2013, expanding on average by 18.3% (KPMG, 2015). This data carries substantial 
weight if we have in mind that the model is being implemented since 2004. Furthermore, 
electricity production is constantly increasing, highlighting the infrastructural expansion in 
the field of energy (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Angola: Dutch Disease Related Indicators. The indicators highlight an 
increase in electricity production, an expansion of the manufacturing sector and a 
relatively constant inflation rate. 
 
2. Vulnerability due to commodity dependence – Slightly positive effect 
In 2011, the Angolan Trade Minister stated that Angola‟s foremost challenge and task is 
diversification of its economy beyond oil (People‟s daily, 2011). Nevertheless, Angola is still 
vulnerable to the volatility of oil prices, due to the fact that, as a part of this model, the price 
of resources that back the loan is not determined up-front, but calculated at the market price 
on the day it is sold
 
(Brautigam, 2009). Thus, it is not surprising that the falling oil prices 
have led to a slowdown of the economic growth (Muzima and Mendy, 2015). However, the 
                                                 
11
 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration; In Billions of Kilowatthours. 
12
 Source: National Bank of Angola; In Billions of Dollars. 
13
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Indicators Year 
2004 2006 2007 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 
Electricity 
Generation
11
 
2.1 3.2 3.1 4 5.3 5.4 - - 
GDP From 
Manufacturing
12
 
- - 241 303 464 726 - - 
% Inflation of 
Consumer 
Prices
13
 
43 13 12 12 14 10 8 7 
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dependence of the Angolan economy on oil rents has been reduced, thus, albeit in a limited 
manner, easing this aspect of the resource curse on Angola (see Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Angola: Commodity Dependence Related Indicators. The indicators 
point to an overall positive economic development, which includes a reduction 
in the reliance on oil rents, even though that reliance is still significant. The 
fact that the GDP per capita continues to grow while, at the same time, the 
dependence on oil rents subsides is of significant importance. 
 
3. Adverse effects on the governance of the country – Inconclusive 
Angola has done a poor job of building efficient state institutions. One of the main reasons 
being that the ruling party (MPLA) builds loyal political networks through the distribution of 
patronages (Paul, Clarke and Serena, 2014). However, revenue that funds such patronage 
politics originates from oil sales on the international market, not from the deals made through 
the Infrastructure for Resource model. It can be said that the corruption would be worse if the 
model was replaced by the traditional cash for oil sales on the international market.   
On the other hand, there are reports of social housing, which is built through the model, being 
allocated preferentially. If proven correct, that would imply a negative influence of the model 
on the quality of governance in Angola. In the aforementioned example, the purchase cost of 
the housing was initially very high; it catered to a small middle class and thus excluded the 
majority of the people. However, recently the prices have been decreased and funding criteria 
eased (Benazeraf and Alves, 2014). Claims that the model has a negative effect on 
governance are not backed up by the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators and Corruption Perceptions Index, which highlight the 
relatively stable level of governance since the beginning of this model‟s implementation (see 
                                                 
14
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
15
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
Indicators Year 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
GDP per capita
14
 1300 2800 4400 3900 5500 5900 
Oil Rents as % of 
GDP
15
 
53.9 
  
65.3 
  
38.1 
  
45.5 
  
41.1 
  
34.6 
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Table 4). Thus, more research is needed into the nature of the allocation of the housing built 
through the Infrastructure for Resources model. At this point, the most precise answer that 
this research can give is that perhaps the effect of the model on the quality of governance, 
even if negative, is not of sufficient significance to have an effect on the aforementioned 
governance indicators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Angola: Governance Indicators. Three of the indicators state 
that the quality of governance has remained relatively the same since the 
model started being implemented, which challenges the initial 
assumption that the model would have a positive effect on governance. 
On the other hand, the African Governance Index highlights a relatively 
large improvement in the quality of governance; however, there is no 
other data available that would back such a result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; CPIA public sector management and 
institutions cluster average; (Score 1-6, 6=best). 
17
 Source: Transparency International; (Score 0-100, 100=best). 
18
 Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2014; (Score 0-100, 100=best). 
19
 Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators; (Score -2.5 to 2.5, 2.5=best).  
Indicators Year 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments
16
 
- 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 - 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index
17
 
20 22 19 19 22 19 
African Governance 
Index
18
 
28 34 38 40 41 40 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators
19
 
Control of 
Corruption 
-1.3 -1.2
  
-1.3
  
-1.3 -1.3 -1.5 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-1.3 -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 
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Table 5: Findings of the Angola Case Study. Even 
though the model does not successfully tackle all the 
three aspects of the resource curse, it still is a 
valuable instrument that can partially subdue the 
resource curse. 
 
Conclusion  
To conclude, China‟s economic involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly based on 
the Infrastructure for Resources model, through which the Sub-Saharan countries‟ 
infrastructural needs are being fulfilled. Furthermore, this model directly transforms resources 
into development projects and thus it is an efficient instrument for dealing with the resource 
curse that hinders the development of many Sub-Saharan countries. However, further research 
needs to be undertaken on the nature of the allocation of the housing that is built through this 
model, with the focus on whether, and to what extent, it can be used as a tool of patronage 
politics. Even though the model does not tackle all three aspects of the resource curse, the 
ones that it manages to tackle demonstrate its substantial potential in, at least partially, 
subduing the resource curse. That is why the Infrastructure for Resources model highlights 
China‟s innovative approach to the economic development of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, to many Sub-Saharan countries it is an enticing alternative when compared with 
loans from international institutions with democracy-promoting conditions attached to them. 
Bearing in mind the fact that many Sub-Saharan countries possess vast deposits of resources, 
we can anticipate an ever greater interaction between China and Africa, primarily through the 
Infrastructure for Resources model.  
 
 
Aspects of the Resource 
Curse 
The Effects of the 
Model  
Dutch Disease Positive  
Vulnerability due to 
commodity dependence 
Slightly Positive 
Governance  Inconclusive 
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